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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.
ROBERT A. LUCERO,

:

Case No. 920821-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §782a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1992) and Rule 26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure (1992), whereby the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over appeals from a final order for anything other
than a First Degree or Capital Felony.

Lucero was convicted of

the crime of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to
Assault, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-10-507 (1973).
Pursuant to Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Lucero filed a timely Notice of Appeal on February 19, 1993.

A

copy of Lucero 7 s Notice of Appeal is attached hereto as Addendum
A.
STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-507 (1973) provides:
Possession of deadly weapon with intent to
assault. Every person having upon his person
any dangerous weapon with intent to
unlawfully assault another is guilty of a
Class A misdemeanor.

Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
After the jury has retired for deliberation,
if they desire to be informed on any point of
law arising in the cause, they shall inform
the officer in charge of them, who shall
communicate such request to the court. The
court may then direct that the jury be
brought before the court where, in the
presence of the defendant and both counsel,
the court shall respond to the inquiry or
advise the jury that no further instructions
shall be given. Such response shall be
recorded. The court may in its discretion
respond to the inquiry in writing without
having the jury brought before the court, in
which case the inquiry and the response
thereto shall be entered in the record.
Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or
indictment. Upon an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything
upon his or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing him to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or
concerning his mental processes in connection
therewith, expect that a juror may testify on
the question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the
jury's attention or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon
any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence
of any statement by him concerning a matter
about which he would be precluded from
testifying be received for these purposes.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1:

Was the trial judge's Supplemental Instruction

to the jury during their deliberations an incorrect and
misleading statement of the law that applied in the case?
Standard of Review:

This Court reviews the trial court's
2

factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard of review.
However, the question of "whether these facts are sufficient to
demonstrate reliability is a question of law, which [this Court]
review[s] for correctness."
(Utah 1991);

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782

see also State v. Mincv, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 21

(Utah App. 1992).
Issue No. 2:

Did the trial judge err in communicating with

the jury during their deliberations in violation of Rule 17(m) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure?
Standard of Review:

This Court reviews the trial court's

factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard of review.
However, the question of "whether these facts are sufficient to
demonstrate reliability is a question of law, which [this court]
review[s] for correctness."
(Utah 1991);

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782

see also State v. Mincv, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 21

(Utah App. 1992).
Issue No. 3:

Did the trial judge err in refusing to

consider the affidavit of a juror in ruling on Lucero's Motion
for a New Trial, which affidavit provides testimony regarding
extraneous prejudicial information that was improperly brought to
the jury's attention by the trial judge's unauthorized
communication?
Standard of Review.

This court reviews the trial court's

factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard of review.
However, the question of "whether these facts are sufficient to
demonstrate reliability is a question of law, which [this Court]
3

review[s] for correctness."
(Utah 1991);

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782

see also State v. Mincy, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 21

(Utah App. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In an Information, dated August 5, 1992, the State charged
Appellant, Robert Lucero, with one count of Possession of a
Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault, a Class A misdemeanor, one
count of Speeding, a Class C misdemeanor, and one count of Faulty
Equipment, an Infraction.

R. 1-3.

The Faulty Equipment charge

was dismissed upon Lucero's motion and the charges of Possession
of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault and Speeding were sent
to the jury following the conclusion of the case.

T. 125-129.2

On October 2, 1992, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the
charge of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault, a
Class A misdemeanor and Speeding, a Class C misdemeanor.
109, T. 184.

On October 30, 1992, Lucero was sentenced to one year

jail plus a $2,000 fine and $150 attorney recoupment fee.
118.

R. 108-

R. 113-

The court suspended 360 days of the jail and $1,000 of the

fine upon eighteen months probation.

R 113-118.

On January 13,

1993 the Court of Appeals granted Lucero's Petition for Certificate
of Probable Cause, staying the imposition of the Circuit Court's
sentence pending this appeal.

R. 159.

1

All citations to the transcript of the Jury Trial held on
October 2, 1992 shall be designated as "T."
4

On November 6, 1992, Lucero filed a Motion for a New Trial
and a Memorandum in Support of Motion for a New Trial.
12 9, 135-136.

R. 119-

A copy of Lucero's Motion and Memorandum are

attached hereto as Addendum B.

As additional support for

Lucero's Motion for New Trial, Lucero filed the Affidavit of
Barbara Brown, a juror.

R. 130-132.

A copy of the Affidavit of

Barbara Brown ("Brown Affidavit") is attached hereto as Addendum
C.
On November 12, 1992, a hearing was held on Lucero's Motion
for a New Trial.

MT. 1-13.2.

On February 5, 1993, the trial judge signed an order denying
Lucero's Motion for a New Trial.

A copy of the order denying

Lucero's Motion for a New Trial ("Order") is attached hereto as
Addendum D.
On February 5, 1993, the trial judge signed a Judgment and
Sentence which set forth the conditions of Lucero's sentence and
terms of probation.

A copy of the Judgment and Sentence is

attached hereto as Addendum E.
On February 19, 1993, Lucero filed a Notice of Appeal3
wherein Lucero appealed his conviction for Possession of a Deadly

2

All citations to the transcript of the hearing on Lucero's
Motion for New Trial held on November 12, 1992 shall be
designated as "MT."
3

Lucero had previously filed a Notice of Appeal on December
11, 1992, which Notice of Appeal was ineffective since it was
filed prior to the filing of a written Judgment and Sentence as
well as Order Denying Lucero's Motion for a New Trial. R. 149150. Therefore, the Notice of Appeal filed on February 19, 1993,
was required to perfect Lucero's appeal.
5

Weapon with Intent to Assault.
his conviction for Speeding.

Lucero has chosen not to appeal
See Addendum A.

The substance of the charge that Lucero unlawfully possessed
a deadly weapon with intent to assault, was that Lucero had upon
his person a dangerous weapon (i.e., screwdriver) with the intent
to unlawfully assault another.

R. 1-3, 56.

instructed on the elements of the offense.

The jury was fully
R. 56.

A copy of

Jury Instruction No. 15, which sets forth the elements of the
offense of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault,
is attached hereto as Addendum F.

All Jury Instructions were in

writing and were sent into the jury room to aid their
deliberations.

R. 39-63, T. 143-155.

Subsequent to the jury's indication to the court that they
were having difficulty reaching a unanimous decision, the court
further instructed the jury on the crime of Possession of a
Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault.

R. Ill, T. 178, 181-182.

This supplemental instruction was the result of the following
question and answer:
JURY'S QUESTION:
COURT'S ANSWER:

Is intent against the law?
It is illegal to possess a deadly

weapon with intent to assault.

Intent without a deadly

weapon is not illegal.
R. Ill, T. 181-182.

The above answer to the jury's question

shall hereafter be referred to as the "Supplemental Instruction."
The Supplemental Instruction on the elements of the crime of
Possession of a Deadly Weapon With Intent to Assault, was given
6

without consultation with Lucero, Lucero's counsel or the
prosecutor.

T. 181-182.

The trial court's Supplemental

Instruction was submitted to the jury without discussion.

R.

Ill, T. 181-182.
Lucero filed a Motion for a New Trial objecting to the trial
judge's Supplemental Instruction.
Addendums B and C.

R. 119-129, 135-136.

See

The trial court denied Lucero's Motion for a

New Trial and further held that the Brown Affidavit was an
improper invasion of the jury's deliberative process.
See Order paragraphs 1 and 3.

MT. 10.

The trial court also held that the

trial judge's ex parte communication with the jury during the
jury's deliberations was not an improper communication with the
jury and did not violate Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

MT. 10.

See Order paragraph 2.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about July 14, 1992, Lucero was accused of Possession
of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault.

R. 1-3.

It was

established at trial that Lucero was in possession of a
screwdriver, which screwdriver the state alleged constituted a
deadly weapon.

T. 60, 69, 99-100, 104, 106, 157-158.

Lucero did

not challenge the state's characterization of the screwdriver as
a deadly weapon.

T. 69, 163.

Instead, Lucero challenged the

state's allegation that he had possessed this screwdriver with
the intent to assault Deputy Taylor.
111, 163-171.
7

T. 69-71, 76, 79-80, 110-

Deputy Winters testified at trial that he did not know
Lucero's intent at the time he was possessing the screwdriver,
nor did he see Lucero attempt to assault Deputy Taylor.
72, 76, 79-80.

Deputy Taylor testified that he felt that Lucero

was about to assault him with the screwdriver.
121-123.

T. 69-

T. 100, 110-111,

However, Deputy Taylor further testified that at the

time the alleged crime occurred that Lucero's demeanor had
changed and he no longer appeared as agitated nor as angry as he
had previous to his picking up the screwdriver.

T. 103, 111.

Lucero was not charged with an assault but was only charged with
Possession of a Deadly Weapon with an Intent to Assault.

T. 110,

123.
Lucero's counsel conceded in his closing argument that
Lucero was in possession of the screwdriver.

T. 163.

Lucero's

counsel stressed in closing argument that there was no intent on
the part of Lucero to assault anyone, either Deputy Taylor or
Deputy Winters.

T. 163-169, 171. Lucero's counsel argued that if

anything, the possession of the screwdriver was a defensive
posture on behalf of Lucero who had previously been pushed by
Deputy Winters.

T. 71, 103, 163-171.

Deputy Taylor further

testified that if Lucero was mad at anyone, his anger was
directed towards Deputy Winters, not himself.

T. 103.

However,

the alleged intent to assault was directed towards Deputy Taylor,
according to the state.

R. 1-3.

After the receipt of all evidence, arguments of counsel and
the jury being instructed by the trial judge on the law that
8

applied, the jury retired for its deliberations.

T. 41-176.

Each juror was provided with a copy of the Jury Instructions as
they were read by the trial judge.

T. 143.

Each juror was

allowed to take their set of the written Jury Instructions into
the jury room to consult during their deliberations.
175.

T. 143,

Jury Instruction No. 15 set forth the elements for the

crime of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault.
R. 56, T. 152-153.

See Addendum E.

with written Verdict Forms.

The jury was also provided

R. 108-109.

The Verdict Forms were

not read into the record nor described by the trial judge.

T.

154.
Throughout the jury's deliberations, the jury sent questions
to the trial court.

R. 110-111, T. 176-183.

The first inquiry

to the court involved a series of four questions.
176-177.

R. 110, T.

Prior to answering these four questions, the trial

judge called Mr. Lucero, his attorney and the prosecutor into the
courtroom and on the record read the jury's questions along with
the trial judge's proposed answers to those questions.
177.

T. 176-

All parties were allowed input into the trial judge's

answers as well as the opportunity to object to any proposed
answer prior to those answers being submitted to the jury.
176-177.

T.

The trial judge wrote the agreed upon answers to the

jury's first inquiry on the same sheet of paper that contained
the written questions and returned it to the jury at
approximately 5:35 p.m.

R. 110, T. 176-177.

Approximately one hour into the jury's deliberations, a
9

second note was sent to the trial judge stating that the jury
could not reach a unanimous decision and asked what they were to
do next.

R. Ill, T. 177-179.

Again, the court called Mr.

Lucero, his attorney and the prosecutor into the courtroom and on
the record read the jury's question along with the trial judge's
proposed answer.

R. Ill, T. 177-179.

The court's proposed

answer was "you must continue to discuss and analyze the evidence
you have heard."

R.lll, T. 177-179.

Following a discussion on

the record, the trial judge's proposed answer was sent to the
jury at approximately 5:49 p.m.

R. Ill, T. 177-179.

Following the trial judge's answering the jury's second
question, the possibility of dinner for the jury as well as
allowing the prosecutor to leave the court building to get dinner
was discussed.

T. 179-181.

It was decided that all parties

would be given approximately twenty-minutes to retrieve dinner
and return to the court by 6:10 p.m.

T. 180.

The jury sent a third question to the trial judge, asking if
they could have Officer Winter's testimony.

R. 111.

The trial

judge answered that, "you must rely upon your memory with the
assistance of your notes."

R. 111.

The answer was sent to the

jury at approximately 5:57 p.m. without consulting Mr. Lucero,
his attorney or the prosecutor.

R. Ill, T. 181.

The jury sent a fourth question to the trial judge.
T. 181-182.

R. Ill,

The jury's question and the trial judge's answer was

as follows:
JURY'S QUESTION:

Is intent against the law?
10

COURT'S ANSWER:

It is illegal to possess a deadly

weapon with intent to assault.

Intent without a deadly

weapon is not illegal.
R. Ill, T. 181-182.

This Supplemental Instruction was sent to

the jury at approximately 6:09 p.m. without consulting Mr.
Lucero, his attorney, or the prosecutor.

R. Ill, T. 181-182.

Subsequently, the trial judge called Mr. Lucero, his
attorney and the prosecutor into the courtroom to place on the
record the jury's third and fourth questions along with the trial
judge's ex parte answers.

T. 181-183.

The trial judge indicated

on the record that the Supplemental Instruction was sent to the
jury on the trial judge's own initiative and that the
Supplemental Instruction was never discussed or presented to Mr.
Lucero, his attorney or the prosecutor prior to being submitted
to the jury.

T. 181-182.

A discussion was held on the record regarding the trial
judge's ex parte Supplemental Instruction of the jury, wherein
Lucero's counsel indicated to the court that he had some concern
that the answer did not specifically require an intent to
assault.

T. 181-182.

In response to this specific concern the

trial judge responded that, "I assume that's what they're talking
about is intent to assault."

T. 181-182.

Again, Lucero's counsel expressed his concern that the trial
judge's answer was confusing by stating that, "tt]he answer to
[that question] I think would have been much clearer if it would
have been intent to assault with a deadly weapon is a crime."
11

T.

182.

A brief discussion followed wherein the prosecutor and

trial judge indicated that it had been their assumption that
since intent to assault had been referred to in a portion of the
trial judge's Supplemental Instruction, that the jury would
assume that it applied in the last sentence wherein the court
merely stated that,

fI

illegal,"

The issue as to how the jury's question

T. 182.

[i]ntent without a deadly weapon is not

should have been answered was left unresolved.

T. 182.

Shortly after the jury had received the Supplemental
Instruction, the trial judge was notified that the jury had
reached a decision.

T. 183.

The jury was returned to the

courtroom and informed the court that it had reached a verdict of
guilty and that the verdict was unanimous.

T. 184.

The Verdict

Form signed by the jury foreman stated that, "We, the jurors in
the above case, find the defendant 'GUILTY' OF: POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON."

R. 108.

hereto as Addendum G.

A copy of the Verdict Form is attached

The trial judge read the jury's verdict

and in so doing read that

ff

[w]e, the jurors in the above case,

find the defendant guilty of possession of a deadly weapon with
intent to assault."

T. 184.

Prior to receipt of the court's Supplemental Instruction,
the jury had been unable to reach a unanimous decision.
T. 177-178.

R. 110,

At least one juror was of the opinion that the trial

judge, through his Supplemental Instruction, was directing the
jury how to decide.

MT. 2-10.

See Brown Affidavit.

That based

upon the trial judge's Supplemental Instruction, the jury
12

concluded that intent to possess a deadly weapon was enough and
no longer discussed the issue of whether or not Mr. Lucero had
intended to assault another person.
Affidavit, paragraphs 11 and 13.

MT. 2-10.

See Brown

It was only after the receipt

of the trial judge's Supplemental Instruction, that the jury was
able to reach a unanimous verdict of guilty.

See Brown

Affidavit, paragraph 14.
On November 6, 1992, Lucero filed a timely Motion for New
Trial based on the grounds that the jury was improperly
instructed on the law that applied and that the trial judge had
improperly communicated with the jury in violation of Rule 17(m)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

R. 119-132, 135-136.

See Addendum B and C.

The trial court denied Lucero7s Motion for

a New Trial.

See Addendum D

MT. 10.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial judge's Supplemental Instruction to the jury
during their deliberations was given in violation of Rule 17(m)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

When the safeguards

intended by Rule 17(m) are violated, a presumption of prejudice
is raised and the burden is shifted to the prosecution to rebut
that presumption.

Furthermore, the Supplemental Instruction

cannot be shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have been a harmless
intrusion upon the jury's deliberative process.
Not only was the communication with the jury inappropriate,
but the Supplemental Instruction was an incorrect statement of
13

the law.

The jury had previously been fully instructed upon the

elements of the offense of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with
Intent to Assault.

See Instruction No. 15.

(Addendum F ) .

The

trial judge's explanation and the prosecutor's argument that it
assumed that what was being referred to was "intent to assault"
is insufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice raised by
such contact.

Since the jury could have been asking something

different and since the trial judge's answer could logically have
been interpreted as deleting an essential element of the crime,
the trial judge's Supplemental Instruction was an incorrect
statement of law and obviously confusing to the jury.

Especially

when coupled with the Verdict Form submitted to the jury which
only referred to "Possession of Deadly Weapon."

Therefore,

Lucero was entitled to a new trial and it was error for the trial
court to deny Lucero's timely motion.
The trial judge's communication with the jury in violation
of the safeguards of Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure was per se unauthorized.

Therefore, the jury received

extraneous prejudicial information which could have effected the
jury's verdict.

When such extraneous prejudicial information is

an issue involved in the challenge of a jury's verdict, it is
appropriate for the court to consider juror's affidavits in
assessing the impact of the extraneous prejudicial information.
The Brown Affidavit regarding the impact of the trial judge's
Supplemental Instruction (i.e., extraneous prejudicial
information) was admissible under the evidentiary rule providing
14

that a juror may testify on the question of whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's
attention or whether any outside influences are brought to bear
upon any juror.
Thus, it was error for the trial court not to consider the
Brown Affidavit in determining whether or not the trial judge's
unauthorized Supplemental Instruction could be shown to be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

This court should consider

the Brown Affidavit, which establishes obvious prejudice to Mr.
Lucero, and reverse the trial court's denial of Lucero's Motion
for a New Trial.

ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT IMPROPERLY COMMUNICATED WITH THE JURY IN VIOLATION
OF RULE 17 (m) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND SUCH
COMMUNICATION WAS PREJUDICIAL TO MR, LUCERO.
A, The safeguards afforded Mr. Lucero were
circumvented by the trial judge's unauthorized
communication with the jury.
At all times prior to the trial judge's submission of it's
Supplemental Instruction to the jury, the trial judge properly
called Mr. Lucero, his counsel and the prosecutor into the
courtroom and discussed on the record proposed answers to the
jury's inquiries.
is set forth in

The proper procedure for instructing the jury

Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure and is as follows:
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they
desire to be informed on any point of law arising in
the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of
them, who shall communicate such request to the court.
15

The court may then direct that the jury be brought
before the court where, in the presence of the
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to
the inquiry or advise the jury that no further
instructions shall be given. Such response shall be
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to
the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought
before the court, in which case the inquiry and the
response thereto shall be entered in the record.
The safeguards mandated by Rule 17(m) of allowing the defendant
and both counsel an opportunity to object to any further
instruction of the jury was circumvented in this case by the
trial judge's unilateral Supplemental Instruction of the jury.
Rule 17(m) does not specifically reiterate the safeguards
set forth in the body of the rule following the alternative of
responding in writing to jury inquiries.

However, the logical

reading of the Rule mandates that all safeguards apply,
regardless of whether the trial judge consults the jury in the
courtroom or decides to communicate with the jury in writing.
The policy concerns are the same regardless of how the response
is communicated to the jury.

Furthermore, the importance of

allowing the defendant and both counsel an opportunity to
challenge the court's proposed answers applies equally to written
communications and in-court communications.
This case illustrates the importance of the safeguards
mandated in Rule 17(m), in that, had Mr. Lucero and both counsel
been consulted prior to the unauthorized communication by the
trial judge, Mr. Lucero's express concerns over the confusing
nature of the trial judge's Supplemental Instruction could have
been resolved -- making this appeal unnecessary.
16

However, at the

time Lucero and his counsel were informed of the trial judge's
communication, the jury had already been improperly instructed.
Therefore, Lucero was required to proceed through a Motion for a
New Trial to correct the impact of the extraneous prejudicial
communication.
B. The state has failed to rebut the presumption of
prejudice raised by the trial judged unauthorized
communication.
Those courts addressing the issue of the trial court's
communication with the jury during their deliberations uniformly
require that appropriate and adequate safeguards must be taken
and that the instructions must properly state the law.4
Recognizing the necessity of supplemental instructions to the
jury during their deliberations, courts have developed rules
safeguarding those communications as well as a specific standard
of review when those communications do not comply with the
safeguards established.
In State v. Fletcher, 717 P.2d 866 (Ariz. 1986) the Supreme
Court of Arizona cited long-time precedents that "it is
reversible error for a trial judge in a criminal case to
communicate with the jurors after they have retired to deliberate
unless the defendant and counsel have been notified and given an
opportunity to be present."

State v. Fletcher, 717 P.2d at 870

4

No Utah case law specifically addressing' the scope and
requirements of Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
exists. However, the cases cited in this section of Lucero's brief
rely on statutes similar to Rule 17 (m) as a basis for their
analysis.
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[citations omitted].

Noting that the trial judge's actions were

strongly disapproved of, the Fletcher court stated that, "[t]he
test of whether erroneous jury communications require reversal is
whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was not prejudiced by the communication."

Id. See

People v. Woodward, 631 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1981) (instructions
given must properly state the law).
All courts which have addressed this issue seem to follow
the Fletcher analysis, however, most courts have found that the
unauthorized communication was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
based upon the appellate court's analysis of the nature of the
communication and it's effect upon the jury.

See e.g.. State v.

Fletcher, 717 P.2d 866 (Ariz. 1986) (even though court's
supplemental instruction was error, it was found to be harmless
since the instruction did not misstate the law) ; Cavanaucrh v.
State, 729 P. 2d 481 (Nev. 1986) (while the court's answering
without notice to counsel was error, the error was harmless since
the instruction was correct); Fisher v. State, 736 P.2d 1003
(Okl. Cir. 1987) (presumption of prejudice was overcome since
court's unauthorized communication involved the court merely
returning the question to the jury indicating that it would not
answer); State v. Allen, 749 P.2d 702 (Wash. App. 1988) (trial
court's improper response to jury's inquiry without contacting
defendant or defendant's attorney, was harmless where the court
merely told the jury to read the instructions and continue with
deliberations); People v. Leonardo, 687 P.2d 511 (Colo. App.
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1984) (court found harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt,
since defendant was not prejudiced by trial court's answer
referring jury to instructions already given); State v. Koch, 673
P.2d 297 (Ariz. 1983) (reversal is not required if it can be said
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced
by improper communications between judge and jury) and State v.
Sammons, 749 P.2d 1372 (Ariz. 1988) (unauthorized written
communication which added nothing was harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt).
The above cases all adhere to the general rule that it is
prejudicial error for the trial court to communicate with the
jury without previously consulting with the defendant and
counsel.

Furthermore, they require that when an unauthorized

communication occurs the burden is placed on the State to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that the unauthorized communication was
harmless.

Most courts which have addressed this issue, as

illustrated above, have involved refusals to answer by the trial
judge or a referral to the jury instructions.

However, when the

trial judge's unauthorized communication involves more than a noanswer or an answer directing the jury to consult what it already
has, the determination of error is much more difficult.
When the trial judge's unauthorized communication with the
jury misstates the law, comments on the facts, or would tend to
be confusing to the jury; reversible error is typically found.
Once an unauthorized communication has occurred, the focus of the
court is on the type of action taken by the court in the
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defendant's absence, not the propriety of that action.
State, 719 P.2d 265, 267 (Alaska App. 1986).

Jones v.

Emphasizing the

importance of following appropriate safeguards, the Court of
Appeals of Alaska stated the following:
A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at
every stage of the trial and to be notified of any
communication from the jury. Failure to notify the
defendant of a jury communication is constitutional
error that requires reversal on appeal unless the error
is found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover,
the state bears the burden of proving the error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt... [T]he error
occurs in not allowing the defendant to offer comments,
suggestions, and objections to guide the substance and
phrasing of the court's response to the jury.
Jones v. State, 719 P.2d at 266-267 [citations omitted].
Applying the general requirements set forth above, the Jones
Court noted that although the evidence against Jones was strong;
his defense, in part, was that he did not exert sufficient
control over the allegedly stolen property to be guilty of theft.
The Jones' court indicated that since the jury's inquiry was
about the definition of "exert control," that the court must
assume that the jury believed that definition was important to
its resolution of the case.

Therefore, the trial court's answer

which "merely restated the jury instructions" was insufficient in
that it did not attempt to clarify an area where the jury was
obviously confused. Id.
As the court in Jones indicated it may be necessary for the
trial judge to answer, other than simply referring the jury to
the instructions, when it is obvious that they're confused on
some point. Id.

However, as the Jones' court aptly points out,
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error occurs in not allowing the defendant to offer comments,
suggestions, and objections to guide the substance and phrasing
of the court's response to the jury. Id.
In Mr. Lucero's case, the jury's question regarding "intent"
may have indicated that they were confused as to what the intent
element required -- for example, intent to assault only; intent
to possess a deadly weapon only; or, both intents simultaneously.
The trial judge's Supplemental Instruction only confused the
issue of intent.

Especially, given the Verdict Form which

allowed them to find Mr. Lucero guilty of "Possession of Deadly
Weapon."

See Addendum G.

It may have been appropriate in Mr. Lucero's case to merely
refer the jury to Instruction No. 15, which sets forth the
elements of the crime. See Addendum F.

At minimum, an open

discussion with Mr. Lucero and counsel could have resolved the
issue.
The trial judge committed reversible error by giving the
Supplemental Instruction that allowed the jury to conclude that a
uniformity of an intent to possess and an intent to assault was
not required for conviction of the crime of "Possession of Deadly
Weapon."

See Addendum G.

See e.g. Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d

1252 (Colo. 1986) (constitutional error occurred as a result of
trial judge's failure to obtain presence of defendant's attorney
when the trial judge responded to jury's question whether
"knowing or believing" for purpose of theft by receiving meant
same as "having suspicion of" because it could have affected the
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verdict and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the
question indicated serious misunderstanding with regard to
culpable mental state required); (State v. McCarter, 604 P.2d
1242 (N.M. 1980) (response to message from jury indicating they
were having difficulty reaching a unanimous decision in light of
defendant's absence when message was received and response that
"you must consider further deliberations" was error requiring a
new trial); Hovev v. State, 726 P.2d 344 (N.M. 1986) (state
failed to meet burden of proof to overcome presumption of
prejudicial error as a result of improper communications, where
state made no effort to demonstrate the jury's verdict was not
affected by trial court's communication) and State v. Bretz, 590
P.2d 614 (Mont. 1979) (court's material variance of a previous
instruction without consultation with the defendant or either
counsel required reversal).
II, THE TRIAL JUDGED SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION WAS AN INCORRECT
STATEMENT OF THE LAW THAT APPLIED IN THE CASE AND CONSTITUTES
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
It is axiomatic that any instruction to the jury must be a
correct statement of law and when instructing on a particular
crime must contain all essential elements for the commission of
the crime.

See State v. Anderson, 498 P.2d 295, 299 (Mont. 1972)

(jury instruction was incorrect statement of law and confusing to
jury, therefore, defendant was entitled to a new trial); State v.
Byers, 768 P.2d 414 (Ore. App. 1989) (defendant was entitled to a
new trial based on error in a verdict form submitted to jury
which incorrectly stated one element of the substantive crime)
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and State v. Cathey, 741 P.2d 738 (Kan. 1987) (jury instructions
which are erroneous and misleading can constitute grounds for a
new trial).
The trial judge's answer to the jury's inquiry as to whether
intent was against the law was an incorrect statement of the law.
The trial judge neglected to clearly outline to the jury the
additional requirement that "intent to assault" must also be
established.

The trial judge's Supplemental Instruction allowed

the jury to determine guilt based solely upon an intent to
possess a deadly weapon; thus, misleading the jury as to all
essential elements required.

See Brown affidavit.

The trial

judge's incorrect and confusing Supplemental Instruction is
particularly troublesome given the Verdict Form signed by the
jury. See Addendum G.
The prosecution has alleged that the context of the trial
judge's answer was clear.

The prosecution claims that even

though the trial judge dropped the reference to "intent to
assault" in it's final pronouncement of the law, it is not
confusing because "intent to assault" was mentioned above and
therefore is inferred below.

Yet, even the trial judge was not

clear on the import of his answer.

For example, when confronted

with the omission of "intent to assault" the trial judge replied
that, "I assume that's what they're talking about is intent to
assault."
Adding to the confusion, is the fact that the trial judge's
Supplemental Instruction was stated in the negative. Transferring
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that answer to an affirmative statement of the law results in
"intent and a deadly weapon is illegal."

Thus, leading the jury

to conclude that intent to possess a deadly weapon was sufficient
for conviction.

See Brown Affidavit, paragraphs 11 and 13. And,

resulted in their signing the Verdict Form finding Lucero guilty
of "Possession of Deadly Weapon."

R. 111.

The correctness of the trial judge's Supplemental
Instruction must be evaluated from the perspective that the
burden is upon the state to prove the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

See Point I, above.

The state has argued that

given the totality of the circumstances and all of the Jury
Instructions read together, that the Supplemental Instruction was
not misleading or confusing to the jury.

However, as the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in United
States v. McDaniel, the proper question is what could the jury
have been asking by their question, not what the court may assume
they were asking.

United States v. McDaniel, 545 F.2d 642, 644

(9th Cir. 1976) .
The McDaniel court reasoned as follows:
During the deliberations, the jury sent
note asking, 'Can an individual aid and
without knowledge that a crime is being
The court sent back the answer, 'Yes 7 .

the court a
abet the crime
committed?7
This was error.

Presumably, the court interpreted the jury's question
as asking whether the aider and abetter must know that
the activity was a crime. It is true that ignorance of
the law is no excuse, but the jury's question was not
that simple. The jury could have been asking whether
Barbara could be guilty of aiding or abetting without
knowing that Ulysses was committing the various
forbidden elements of the principal crime, not whether
she knew those acts to be illegal.
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United States v. McDaniel, 545 F.2d at 644 [Emphasis added]. The
McDaniel court held that the trial judge's answer to the jury's
question could have caused the jury to disregard the requisite
scienter element and therefore inappropriately convict the
defendant.
A similar result is possible in Mr. Lucero's case.

The

jury's question "is intent against the law?", was phrased in such
a manner that the real purpose or thrust of the question is
difficult to determine.

The jury could have been asking whether

intent to possess a deadly weapon, alone, was against the law -as the Verdict Form seemed to imply.

See Addendum G.

Or,

perhaps the jury was asking whether some additional overt acts
were required in addition to the subjective intent to commit an
assault while possessing a deadly weapon.

Regardless of the

jury's intention in asking their question, the trial judge's
assumption that they were asking one specific question versus
other viable questions points to the reversible error that was
committed.

See United States v. McDaniel, 545 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.

1976).
Courts which have found harmless error involved
circumstances where the judge's response to a question was
legally correct and suggested no additional or improper meaning.
State v. Frederick, 648 P.2d 925, 927 (Wash. App. 1982).

But,

when an ambiguous question is involved and the trial judge's
response is legally incorrect under one interpretation, the
result is that reversible error has been committed.
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United

States v. McDaniel. 545 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1976). The Lucero case
is analogous to the McDaniel case.

Both involved ambiguous

questions.
The trial judge's Supplemental Instruction to the jury's
ambiguous question of "is intent against the law?" was clearly
erroneous and prejudicial.

See Brown Affidavit.

Therefore, Mr.

Lucero is entitled to a new trial.
III. THE BROWN AFFIDAVIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED TO SHOW THAT
EXTRANEOUS PREJUDICIAL INFORMATION WAS IMPROPERLY BROUGHT TO THE
JURY'S ATTENTION.
Juror affidavits are generally inadmissible for the purpose
of impeaching their verdict.
(Utah 1976).

Johnson v. Simons, 551 P.2d 515

Yet, the adoption of Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules

of Evidence provides an exception to the general rule. Hillier v.
Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 (Utah App. 1987).

In Hillier the Utah

Court of Appeals noted that under Utah Rules of Evidence 606(b)
"a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous
prejudicial inFormation was improperly brought to the jury's
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought
to bear upon any juror." Id. at 305.
Since the trial judge failed to comply with Rule 17(m)
safeguards, the communication with the jury (i.e. Supplemental
Instruction) was unauthorized.

And, as such, constitutes

extraneous prejudicial information that was improperly brought to
the jury's attention.

Therefore, the Brown Affidavit is

admissible on the issue of whether or not the Supplemental
Instruction (i.e., extraneous information) was "prejudicial."
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See Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d at 305.
In applying Rule 606(b), the Hillier court concluded that a
dictionary was "extraneous information." Id.

It went on to hold

that because a question existed as to whether or not use of the
dictionary was "prejudicial," juror affidavits were admissible
under Rule 606(b). Id.
In Lucero the ex parte unauthorized communication with the
jury was "extraneous information."

Since a question exists as to

whether or not use of the Supplemental Instruction was
"prejudicial," the Brown Affidavit is admissible under Rule
606(b).

See Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 (Utah App. 1987).

A review of the Brown Affidavit clearly indicates that the
Supplemental Instruction was extraneous information that was
highly "prejudicial."

Therefore, this Court should reverse the

trial court's denial of Mr. Lucero's Motion for a New Trial and
remand this case to the Circuit Court for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Lucero requests that this court reverse the trial court's
order denying Lucero's Motion for a New Trial and remand the case
for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this / v

day of M^y7~i993.

PATRICK L. ANDERSON'
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, PATRICK L. ANDERSON, hereby certify that I have caused
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court
of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84102 and two copies to C. Dane Nolan, Salt Lake

County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
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ADDENDUM A

PATRICK L. ANDERSON, #4787
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY CITY DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 921002876MS
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE

ROBERT A. LUCERO,
Defendant.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that ROBERT A. LUCERO, defendant in
the above-entitled action, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of
Appeals in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, from the
Judgment and Sentence entered on February 5, 1993 and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial entered on February 5, 1993 by
the Honorable William A. Thome.
,rA

DATED this

H

day of February-) 1993.

VTRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorney for Defendant

PATRICK L. ANDERSON, #4787
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT A. LUCERO,

App. Case No. 930107-CA

Defendant.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOEY FINOCCHIO, hereby certify that on February 22,
19931, I have caused a copy of the Notice of Appeal attached hereto
to be delivered to the South Valley County Attorneys Office, 2001
South State, Suite S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah
DATED this _2

8419jtf"-1200.

day of March, ,1993.

DELIVERED/MAILED this J£_ day of March, 1993.
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ADDENDUM B

PATRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC,
424 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
V.

Case No. 921002876
HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE

ROBERT LUCERO,
Defendant.

Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant, ROBERT LUCERO, hereby moves this court for
an order granting the defendant a new trial in the above-referenced
case.

This motion is based on the ground that the jury was

improperly instructed on the law that applied in this case.
Furthermore, this motion is further based upon the ground that the
court improperly communicated with the jury in violation of Rule
17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The grounds for this motion are more fully set forth in the
accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial and the
Affidavit of Barbara Brown
DATED this (p

day of Novembej^ 1992.

>ATRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the South
Valley County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84190-1200 this

day of November, 1992.

PATRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,

:

v.
ROBERT LUCERO,

:
:
:

Case No. 921002876
HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE

Defendant.
The defendant, ROBERT LUCERO, hereby submits the following
Memorandum in Support of his Motion for a New Trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The above-referenced case was tried before a jury on

October 2, 1992.
2.

After the receipt of all evidence and the jury being

instructed by the court on the law that applied in this case, the
jury retired for itfs deliberations.
3.

The jury was allowed to take a copy of all of the jury

instructions with them to aid their deliberations.
4.

The jury instructions contained an elements instruction

for the crime of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to
Assault.

See Instruction No. 15.

5.

That throughout the jury's deliberations, the jury sent

questions to the court.
6.

Prior to answering most of the questions submitted to

the court by the jury, the court called the defendant and his
attorney, along with the prosecutor before the court and announced
the jury's questions on the record, along with the court's proposed
answers to those questions.
7.

All answers which were ultimately given to the jury, as

referred to in paragraph 6 above, were discussed by all parties and
approved by the defendant, defendant's counsel and the prosecutor.
8.

That approximately one hour into the jury's

deliberations they sent a note to the court stating that they could
not reach a unanimous decision and asked what to do next.
9.

After discussion with the defendant, the defendant's

counsel and the prosecutor, the court sent an answer into the jury
asking them to "continue to discuss it and see if you can reach a
decision."
10.

The answer referred to in paragraph 9 above, was

submitted to the jury after the approval of the defendant, the
defendant's counsel and the prosecutor.
11.

At some point during the jury's deliberations, the

court discussed with the defendant, defendant's counsel and the
prosecutor, the possibility of dinner for the jury as well as
allowing the prosecutor to leave the court building for a period of
twenty minutes to get dinner and bring it back to the court.
12.

It was decided that the prosecutor would be given a

period of twenty minutes to leave the court and return with dinner.
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13.

Upon the prosecutor's return to the court, the

defendant, the defendant's counsel and the prosecutor were called
into the court to discuss what had happened during the prosecutor's
absence,
14.

The defendant, defendant's counsel and the prosecutor

were informed by the court that the court had received two
additional questions while the prosecutor was gone.
15.

The court indicated to the defendant, defendant's

counsel and the prosecutor that the court had already answered the
questions referred to in paragraph 14 above, and that it was now the
court's intention to put those questions and answers on the record.
16.

The court's answers referred to in paragraph 14 above,

were sent to the jury on the court's own initiative and the answers
were never discussed or presented to the defendant, defendant's
counsel or the prosecutor prior to being submitted to the jury.
17.
above, was:
18.

That one of the questions referred to in paragraph 14
"Is intent against the law?"
The court informed the defendant, defendant's counsel

and the prosecutor, that the court had without consultation,
submitted the following answer to the question set forth in
paragraph 17 above:

"It is illegal to possess a deadly weapon with

intent to assault.

Intent without a deadly weapon is not illegal."

19.

At the time the defendant, defendant's counsel and the

prosecutor were informed of the court's answer set forth in
paragraph 18 above, the answer had already been submitted to the
jury without the opportunity for the defendant, defendant's counsel
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or the prosecutor to either object to or approve the court's new
instruction.
20.

That at the time the court informed the defendant,

defendant's counsel and the prosecutor of it's actions, counsel for
the defendant indicated to the court that he had some concern that
the answer did not specifically require an intent to assault.
21.

That in response to the defendant's counsel's concerns

mentioned in paragraph 20 above, the court responded:
what we're talking [about] was intent to assault."

"[I] assumed

The court then

asked if anyone wanted anything put on the record.
22.

In response to the court's inquiry set forth in

paragraph 21 above, the defendant's counsel asked, "Have you already
answered their question?"
23.

To which the court responded, "I have."

In response to the court's affirmation of the timing

of the instruction being sent to the jury as referred to in
paragraph 22 above, the defendant's counsel expressed his concern
that the court's answer was confusing by stating, "The answer to
[that question] I think would have been much clearer if it had been
intent to assault with a deadly weapon is a crime.

But that is a

tough question to answer."
24.

In response to defendant's counsel's statement set

forth in paragraph 23 above, the court repeated the answer it had
unilaterally given to the jury.
25.

See paragraph 18, above.

After the court's repetition of it's answer, referred

to in paragraph 24 above, the prosecutor asserted'that the context
was clear.
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26.

That shortly after the jury had received the new

instruction set forth in paragraph 18 above, the court was notified
that the jury had reached a decision.
27.

The jury was returned to the court and informed the

court that it had reached a verdict of guilty and that the verdict
was unanimous.
28.

That prior to receipt of the court's new instruction

set forth in paragraph 18 above, the jury had been unable to reach a
unanimous decision.
29.

See Affidavit of Barbara Brown, paragraph 9.

That at least one juror felt that the court, through

it's new instruction as set forth in paragraph 18 above, was
directing the jury how to decide.

See Affidavit of Barbara Brown,

paragraph 12.
30.

That based upon the court's new instruction as set

forth in paragraph 18 above, the jury concluded that intent to
possess a deadly weapon was enough and no longer discussed the issue
of whether or not the defendant had intended to assault any person.
See Affidavit of Barbara Brown, paragraphs 11 and 13.
31.

That it was only after the receipt of the court's new

instruction as set forth in paragraph 18 above, that the jury was
able to reach a unanimous verdict of guilty.

See Affidavit of

Barbara Brown, paragraph 14.
32.

That the defendant was sentenced before this court on

October 30, 1992.
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ARGUMENT
I. THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE LAW
THAT APPLIED IN THIS CASE,
Robert Lucero was charged by information with Possession of
A Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault, a Class A Misdemeanor/ in
violation of Utah Code Ann,, §76-10-507 (1953).

The substance of

the allegation is that Robert Lucero did have upon his person a
dangerous weapon with the intent to unlawfully assault another.

The

jury was fully instructed on the elements of this offense, which
instruction was sent into the jury room to help them with their
deliberations.

See

Instruction No. 15.

Subsequent to the jury's indication to the court that they
were having difficulty reaching a unanimous decision, the court
further instructed the jury on the crime of Possession of a Deadly
Weapon with Intent to Assault.

This further instruction was the

result of the following question and answer.
JURY'S QUESTION:
COURT'S ANSWER:

Is intent against the law?
It is illegal to possess a deadly weapon

with intent to assault.

Intent without a deadly weapon is

not illegal.
This further instruction on the elements of the crime was given
without consultation with the defendant, the defendant's counsel or
the prosecutor.

The court's answer was submitted to the jury

without discussion.
It is axiomatic that any instruction given to the jury must
be a correct statement of law and when instructing on a particular
crime must contain all essential elements for the commission of the
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crime.

See State v. Anderson, 498 P.2d 295, 299 (Mont. 1972) (jury

instruction was incorrect statement of law and confusing to jury,
therefore defendant was entitled to a new trial); State v. Byers,
768 P.2d 414 (Ore. App. 1989) (defendant was entitled to a new trial
based on error in a verdict form submitted to a jury which
incorrectly stated one element of the substantive crime) and State
v. Cathey, 741 P.2d 738 (Kan. 1987) (jury instructions which are
erroneous and misleading can constitute grounds for a new trial)
The court's answer to the jury's inquiry as to whether
intent was against the law was an incorrect statement of the law.
The court neglected to clearly outline to the jury the additional
requirement that "intent to assault" must also be established.

The

court's instruction allowed the jury to determine guilt based solely
upon an intent to possess a deadly weapon, thus, misleading the jury
as to all essential elements required for the substantive crime.
See Affidavit of Barbara Brown.

The correct response to the jury's

inquiry would have been to direct the jury's attention to the jury
instructions, which fully set forth all elements required for the
commission of the crime.
The prosecution has alleged that the court's answer
adequately stated all elements of the substantive offense and
therefore was a correct statement of the law.

The basis for the

prosecutor's argument is that the context of the court's answer was
clear.

The prosecution claims that even though the court dropped

the reference to "intent to assault" in its final pronouncement of
the law, it is not confusing to the jury because "intent to assault"
was mentioned above and therefore could be inferred below.
even the court was not absolutely clear on the import of its
answer.

For example, when confronted with the
-7 -

Yet,

omission of "intent to assault" the court replied, "[I] assumed what
we're talking [about] was intent to assault."

Both the prosecutor

and judge have the advantage of a legal background and years of
experience with evaluating elements of a crime.

Unfortunately, the

jurors lack this level of sophistication and probably did not
"assume" anything.

Therefore, the court's answer must be read as it

was interpreted by the jury.

See Affidavit of Barbara Brown.

Adding to the confusion, is the fact that the court's
answer was stated in the negative.

Transfering that answer to an

affirmative statement of the law results in "Intent and a deadly
weapon is illegal."

Thus, leading the jury to conclude that intent

to possess a deadly weapon was sufficient for conviction.

See

Affidavit of Barbara Brown, paragraphs 11 and 13.
Furthermore, contrary to the prosecutor's position, the
reference to "intent to assault" in the enumeration of the crime
involved, does not necessarily follow through as a required element
of the offenes.

Note, that the first sentence of the court's answer

was couched in the language of the name of the crime (i.e. It is
illegal to Possessfion of] a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault).
To illustrate the confusion created by the court's answer,
substitute the phrase "substantive crime" in place of Possession of
a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault and the full effect of the
court's erroneous instruction is obvious.

This substitution results

in the answer: "It is illegal to [commit] the substantive crime.
Intent without a deadly weapon is not illegal."

Stated in the

affirmative, the result is even clearer,—"It is illegal to [commit]
the substantive crime.

Intent and a deadly weapon is illegal."

-8 -

The court's instruction to the jury that "intent without a
deadly weapon is not illegal, was clearly erroneous and prejudicial.
See Affidavit of Barbara Brown.

Therefore, defendant is entitled to

a new trial.
II. THE COURT IMPROPERLY COMMUNICATED WITH THE
JURY IN VIOLATION OF RULE 17(m) OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
At all times prior to the court's answering the jury's
question regarding whether intent was against the law, the court
properly called the defendant, the defendant's counsel and the
prosecutor into the court and discussed on the record proposed
answers to the jury's inquiries.

The proper procedure for

instructing the jury is set forth in Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure and is as follows:
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if
they desire to be informed on any point of law
arising in the cause, they shall inform the
officer in charge of them, who shall communicate
such request to the court. The court may then
direct that the jury be brought before the court
where, in the presence of the defendant and both
counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry
or advise the jury that no further instructions
shall be given. Such response shall be
recorded. The court may in its discretion
respond to the inquiry in writing without having
the jury brought before the court, in which case
the inquiry and the response thereto shall be
entered into the record.
The safeguards intended by Rule 17(m) of allowing the defendant and
both counsel an opportunity to object to any further instruction of
the jury was circumvented in this case by the court's unilateral
instruction of the jury.
At the time the parties were informed of the court's
action, the jury had already been instructed and it was therefore

-9 -

too late for a timely objection.

As a result, the defendant has been

required to file a Motion for a New Trial which is the only remedy
available to him given the court's unilateral communication with the
jury.
Based upon the court's failure to follow the requirements
of Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the
obvious prejudice that has resulted to the defendant, this court
should grant defendant's Motion for a New Trial.

CONCLUSION
Given the facts outlined above, there was a reasonable
likelihood that in the absence of the misleading and inaccurate
instruction of the jury there would have been a different result.
The court should grant defendant's motion for a new trial and
correct the obvious prejudice that has resulted.

DATED this

\£

day of November, 1992.

PATRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorney for Defendant
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the South
Valley County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84190-1200 this

day of November, 1992.
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ADDENDUM C

PATRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532*5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA BROWN

:

v.

:

ROBERT LUCERO,

:

Case No. 921002876
HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE

Defendant.
I, Barbara Brown, give the following affidavit based upon
personal knowledge and under oath:
1.

That on October 2, 1992, I was impanelled as a juror in

the above-referenced case.
2.

That upon completion of all of the evidence, myself and

the other jurors adjourned to a jury room and began our
deliberations.
3.

That throughout the jury deliberations, several

questions were written out by the jury and sent to the court.
4.

That the court sent responses to the questions that

were submitted.
5.

That approximately one hour into the deliberations, the

jury sent a note to the court stating:
unanimous decision.

What is next?"

"We cannot come to a

6.

The court responded to our note with, "Continue to

discuss and see if you can reach a decision."
7.

That approximately two hours into the deliberations the

jury sent the following question to the court:

"Is intent against

the law?"
8.

The court sent in a written response to the question

outlined in paragraph 7 above, which response was as follows:

"It

is illegal to possess a deadly weapon with intent to assault.
Intent without a deadly weapon is not illegal."
9.

That at the time of the receipt of the answer set forth

in paragraph 8 above, the jury had been unable to reach a unanimous
decision.
10.

That upon receipt of the answer from the court set

forth in paragraph 8 above, the jury discussed the above-referenced
case and how it applied to that specific instruction.
11.

That based upon the court's new instruction set forth

in paragraph 8 above, the members of the jury concluded that it was
enough that the defendant had intended to possess a deadly weapon
and based upon that conclusion, found the defendant guilty.
12.

It was my personal opinion upon receipt of the

instruction set forth in paragraph 8 above, that the court was
directing the jury how to decide.
13.

That after receipt of the new instruction set forth in

paragraph 8 above, there was no further discussion as to whether the
defendant intended to assault another person, but the discussion

focused merely upon what the court had directed the jury was
sufficient; that is, the intent to possess a deadly weapon.
14.

Based upon the new instruction that intent to possess

a deadly weapon was sufficient, I changed my vote from not guilty to
guilty.
DATED this

^^A

day of November, 1992.

TO trv^<K^w 6,
BARBARA BROWN
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

On the

ss

.-£day

S~~

of

/y^eJf

/ 1992, personally

appeared before me BARBARA BROWN, the signer of the foregoing
instrument, who'cftr±^^^loi^^^g^^u^,Tn3 that he executed the same.
2145 So. Yuma
|
Salt Lake City,.Utah 84109T / - / / / ) /
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l ^ ^ y ^
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My Commission E x p i r e * ? ] ^ ^ / ^ LJCa*j*JZ+
November 1. \m7r\?X^R^^
KS^**y+X~u—
State of Ut«OTA£Y PUBLIC / \
~

My Commission Expires: //al/,
/

"Residing in:
I 9*3

/
/
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ADDENDUM D

PATRICK L. ANDERSON, #4787
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC,
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v,

:

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

:
:

ROBERT A. LUCERO,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 921002876MS
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE

;

This case came on for hearing on November 12, 1992 and
after considering arguments of counsel and all memorandum and
affidavits filed in support of defendant's Motion for a New Trial
the court held as follows:
1)

That it will not consider the affidavit of Barbara

Brown submitted in support of defendant's Motion for a New Trial on
the grounds the affidavit sets forth facts, if considered by the
court, that would improperly invade the deliberative processes of
the jury.
2.

That the court's written response to the jury question

set forth in defendant's memorandum in support of his Motion for a
New Trial was not an improper communication with the jury and did
not violate Rule 17 (m) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

3.

That given the totality of the circumstances and taking

all of the jury instructions as a complete whole, the court finds
that ie the court's written response to the jury question set forth
in defendant's memorandum in support of his Motion for a New Trial,
was an accurate and complete statement of the law and the court
further finds that its answer could not reasonably be viewed as
tending to mislead the jury.
4.

Based upon the foregoing conclusions of law,

defendant's Motion for a New Trial is denied in its entirely.
DATED this

day of February, 1993.

•S?
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE
Third Circuit Court

PATRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorney for Defendant

DANET NOLAN
Deputy County Attorney

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the South
Valley Office of the County Attorney, 2001 South State Street,
S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah
1993.

84190-1200, this

day of February,

PATRICK L. ANDERSON, #4787
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

:

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

:
:

ROBERT A. LUCERO,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 921002876MS
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE

:

There being no legal or other reason why sentence should
not be imposed, and the defendant have being convicted by a jury of
the offense of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault,
a Class A Misdemeanor and Speeding, a Class C Misdemeanor on October
2, 1992.

The Court entered sentence on October 30, 1992, where the

defendant was sentenced to one year jail plus a $2,000.00 fine and
$150.00 attorney recoupment fee. The Court suspended 360 days of
the jail sentence and $1,000.00 of the fine upon 18 months probation
with the following terms:
1)

Defendant is to comply with all the requirements of

Adult Probation and Parole and be on probation to that agency for a
period of 18 months.

2)

The defendant is to submit to random urinalysis as

requested by the department of Adult Probation and Parole.
3)

The defendant is to serve five days jail, which jail

was subsequently stayed by order of the Utah Court of Appeals,
DATED this

day of February, 1993.

JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNS'
Third Circuit Court
^

i?/^v.

n

-»*

's>\s.j^L,

•4L.

vr?

V>Y;?
PATRICK L. ANDERSON
"tbrney for, Defendant

DANE NOLAN
Deputy County Attorney

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the South
Valley Office of the County Attorney, 2001 South State Street,
S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah
1993.

84190-1200, this

day of February,

ADDENDUM E

ADDENDUM F

INSTRUCTION NO.
To convict the defendant, ROBERT A. LUCERO, of Possession
of a Deadly Weapon with Intent to Assault, each of the following
elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That on or about July 14, 1992,

2.

In Salt Lake County, Utah,

3.

The defendant, ROBERT A. LUCERO,

4.

Did have upon his person a dangerous weapon with

intent to unlawfully assault another.
If you find from the evidence that the elements have been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to return a
verdict of guilty.
However, if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more
of the elements, it is your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

ADDENDUM G

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff

VERDICT

vs.

CASE NUMBER
921002876 MS

ROBERT

LUCERO

We, the Jurors in the above case, find the defendant
" GUILTY" OF: POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON

Dated /£?~d-~~

^P".

19

residing Office/
19
By
Deputy Clerk

